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Abstract
Background: We estimate the effect on light, moderate and heavy consumers of alcohol from implementing a minimum
unit price for alcohol (MUP) compared with a uniform volumetric tax.
Methods: We analyse scanner data from a panel survey of demographically representative households (n = 885) collected
over a one-year period (24 Jan 2010–22 Jan 2011) in the state of Victoria, Australia, which includes detailed records of each
household’s off-trade alcohol purchasing.
Findings: The heaviest consumers (3% of the sample) currently purchase 20% of the total litres of alcohol (LALs), are more
likely to purchase cask wine and full strength beer, and pay significantly less on average per standard drink compared to the
lightest consumers (A$1.31 [95% CI 1.20–1.41] compared to $2.21 [95% CI 2.10–2.31]). Applying a MUP of A$1 per standard
drink has a greater effect on reducing the mean annual volume of alcohol purchased by the heaviest consumers of wine
(15.78 LALs [95% CI 14.86–16.69]) and beer (1.85 LALs [95% CI 1.64–2.05]) compared to a uniform volumetric tax (9.56 LALs
[95% CI 9.10–10.01] and 0.49 LALs [95% CI 0.46–0.41], respectively). A MUP results in smaller increases in the annual cost for
the heaviest consumers of wine ($393.60 [95% CI 374.19–413.00]) and beer ($108.26 [95% CI 94.76–121.75]), compared to a
uniform volumetric tax ($552.46 [95% CI 530.55–574.36] and $163.92 [95% CI 152.79–175.03], respectively). Both a MUP and
uniform volumetric tax have little effect on changing the annual cost of wine and beer for light and moderate consumers,
and likewise little effect upon their purchasing.
Conclusions: While both a MUP and a uniform volumetric tax have potential to reduce heavy consumption of wine and
beer without adversely affecting light and moderate consumers, a MUP offers the potential to achieve greater reductions in
heavy consumption at a lower overall annual cost to consumers.
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Introduction
Alcohol consumption is among the top three risk factors for
global disease burden, accounting for 5.5% of disability-adjusted
life years lost, behind tobacco smoking including second-hand
smoke (6.3%) and high blood pressure (7.0%) [1]. Increasing the
cost of alcohol to consumers, through government pricing and
taxation policies, has been shown to be effective in reducing
overall consumption in the population, rates of heavy drinking,
and the incidence of alcohol-related harm, whether it is
implemented with other complementary alcohol strategies, or on
its own [2,3]. Evidence reviews suggest that a public health-
orientated alcohol pricing and taxation system is one that (i)
increases the minimum price at which alcohol can be purchased,
and/or (ii) taxes products on a volumetric basis (i.e. according to
alcohol content), with the aim of deterring initiation into drinking
and recognising that among current drinkers it is the volume of
alcohol consumed on single occasions and over time that increases
health risks [2,4,5,6].
A motivation for our study is very recent debates, in several
countries around the globe, regarding the desirability of various
pricing and taxation policies for alcohol [7]. Of particular interest
to us are the developments in Scotland where, in May 2012, the
Parliament passed legislation to introduce a minimum unit price
(MUP) for alcohol. At the time of writing, the Scottish legislation is
yet to be implemented amid legal challenges from a number of
European countries [8]. This highlights the fierceness of debate
regarding such policies and the critical importance of building the
empirical evidence base to inform decision-making in the area.
Reforms to pricing policies on alcohol are also being contested
in England. During 2012, the British Prime Minister expressed
support for introducing a MUP and initiated consultations with
industry and health groups, receiving strong support from the
latter [9]. However, in July 2013, the government reversed its
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position on MUP in handing down a report that the consultation
process:
‘‘…has not provided evidence that conclusively demonstrates that
Minimum Unit Pricing (MUP) will actually do what it is meant to:
reduce problem drinking without penalising all those who drink
responsibly. In the absence of that empirical evidence, we have decided
that it would be a mistake to implement MUP at this stage’’ [10].
In Australia, a recent independent panel review of the alcohol
taxation system, commissioned by the government, judged it to be
‘incoherent’ and recommended major reforms so that ‘all alcoholic
beverages should be taxed on a volumetric basis, which, over time,
should converge to a single rate, with a low-alcohol threshold
introduced for all products [11]. Such a tax is also a relatively
simple policy to implement, as noted by the review: ‘a uniform rate
of tax across all beverages is the least complex and most efficient
way of imposing an alcohol tax [11]. The rate of this new
volumetric tax, the panel argued, ‘should be based on evidence of
the net marginal spill over cost of alcohol’ [11]. However, the
review panel cautioned that a uniform volumetric tax may not be
effective at targetting only at those drinkers most likely to cause
social harm. This could mean ‘‘consumers who enjoy alcohol responsibly
(light and moderate drinkers) might face an unnecessarily high price (and pay
too much tax)’’ [11]. Also, importantly, the review noted that while
uniform volumetric tax would provide a floor price, alcohol could
still sometimes be sold below cost or given away [11].
Despite the continuing call for reform from both health and
industry groups, further discussions on volumetric taxation and
MUP policies have now reached an impasse in Australia, with
some groups voicing strong support for the introduction of MUP,
while others have called instead for the introduction of a new
volumetric tax, in part to replace the ad valorem (valued based) tax
on wine products [12]. To some extent, in this context of current
policy discussion in Australia, volumetric taxation and a MUP are
framed as two alternative options. We view this as a clear
opportunity and motivation to examine the respective effects of
each policy, and in doing so we aim to provide timely evidence to
the Australian and international scientific and policy community.
Current practices and expected effects of volumetric
taxation and minimum pricing
Internationally there is a growing trend towards setting alcohol
taxes on a volumetric basis [13], and there are numerous studies
highlighting the effectiveness of this approach to reduce heavy
drinking and alcohol related harm [14,15,16]. In more than 30
developed countries throughout the world alcohol is taxed either
on a volumetric or ad valorem basis [17]. While it is uncommon for
countries to adopt only one of these methods, some, such as
Vietnam, have recently simplified alcohol excise duty rates that
varied for different alcohol products with a new volumetric tax
[13], and the trend internationally is towards setting alcohol excise
rates that reflect the alcohol content of products [6]. However, the
current practice in many jurisdictions is often a very complex
combination of both volumetric and ad valorem taxes, and how each
of the two methods of taxation apply often varies by the type of
alcohol product (i.e. beer, wine, spirits) and by sub-categories
within these types, and also by specific ranges of alcohol content.
In some jurisdictions, alcohol taxes also differ between imported
and locally produced products. Furthermore, public health
objectives are not usually the main influence on alcohol taxation
policy, with government revenue objectives as well as political and
commercial interests often being the main factor. Australia is
typical of the complex alcohol tax arrangements that can emerge
in this context, which are summarised well by Byrnes et al [18]:
Within Australia, volumetric excise taxes are levied on beer and spirits
based on pure alcohol content and an ad valorem excise tax is levied on
wine based on the wholesale price. In addition, there are different tax
rates applied to beer depending on the total strength of alcohol and the
container size (‘kegs’ containing more than 48 litres are taxed
substantially less per litre alcohol than beer sold in individual
containers). Furthermore, the first 1.15% alcohol content in beer is tax
free, a threshold that is not provided for any other alcohol beverage. As
such, there exists a large divide regarding the amount of tax charged for
the equivalent amount of pure alcohol consumed. For example, low
strength draught (i.e. from a keg) beer and cheap wine are taxed
considerably lower than spirits for the same amount of pure alcohol.
From a public health perspective, the advantage of volumetric
taxation over ad valorem taxation is that the latter may lead to some
producers ‘downgrading’ the quality and cost of their products,
resulting in relatively low tax on some beverages despite their high
alcohol content [5]. A potential disadvantage of volumetric taxation,
on the other hand, is that it may result in some consumers switching
to cheaper products as it does not prohibit alcohol from being heavily
discounted or sold below cost [19]. To address this, a separate, or
supplementary policy, which has been suggested is a MUP [20].
However, in the absence of cross-national empirical evidence on the
effects of a MUP, arguments have ensued about its impact, including:
that it may not actually deter heavy drinking; that it may adversely
affect the majority of people who are light or moderate drinkers; and,
that it may disproportionately and hence, unfairly, impact upon low-
income drinkers [12,21]. In view of this, a main aim of our study is to
determine which of these two policies – a volumetric tax or aMUP, is
most effective in reducing heavy consumption and what is the
associated effect on light and moderate consumers.
A MUP for alcohol establishes a government regulated price for
a specified volume of pure alcohol or alcoholic beverage below
which products may not be sold. Depending on the value at which
a MUP is set, it may not necessarily lead to large price increases in
all products [see Table 1]. The appeal of a MUP from a public
health perspective is that it increases the price of the cheapest
alcohol products, which could potentially reduce heavy consump-
tion and, in turn, reduce rates of alcohol-related harm
[18,20,22,23,24,25].
While there is increasing international interest in MUP policies,
to date, very few jurisdictions have adopted this approach and,
subsequently, there is limited evidence on its effects. The only
demonstrated effects of a MUP on alcohol consumption at present
are limited to empirical studies in the Canadian provinces of
British Columbia and Saskatchewan, which found that a 10%
increase in the minimum price of all beverages reduced total
consumption in each province by 3.4% and 8.4%, respectively
[26,27]. Another empirical study in Canada, examining the
relationship between a MUP and alcohol attributable (AA) deaths,
found that 10% increase in the average minimum price for all
alcoholic beverages was associated with a 32% reduction in wholly
AA deaths [28]. However, none of these studies looked at changes
in alcohol consumption, or AA deaths, by type of drinker.
Researchers in the UK modelled the effect of various price policies
on different sub-groups of drinkers and found that a MUP of
£0.50 per unit of alcohol would achieve a greater reduction in
overall consumption and heavy drinking than a ban on
promotions of discount alcohol or increasing the current retail
price of all product categories by 10% [19,29,30]. They also report
Impact of Alcohol Taxation on Type of Drinkers
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that compared to the latter option, a MUP of £0.50 per unit
would impose a smaller annual cost increase on moderate
drinkers. However, comparisons with the effects of volumetric
taxation options were not included in their study.
Hence, our study is very timely and, to the best of our knowledge, is
the first to provide an accurate estimate and comparison of the effects
on light, moderate and heavy alcohol consumers of introducing a
minimum price versus a uniform volumetric tax on off-trade alcohol.
We report changes in the estimated cost (changes in mean
annual consumer spending per capita on alcohol) and changes in
mean annual volume of alcohol consumed per capita resulting
from each of the policy options. Our main finding is that while
both a minimum price and a volumetric tax have potential to
reduce heavy consumption of wine and beer without adversely
affecting light and moderate consumers, a minimum price offers
the potential to achieve greater reductions in heavy consumption
at a lower overall cost to consumers. We further show through
sensitivity analysis that this finding is robust to household
composition, different tax pass-through rates, and implementing
these two policy options simultaneously or separately.
Methods
Data
Our data consists of 885 households participating in the Nielsen
Company’s HomeScan panel survey (also called scanner data) who
recorded their off-trade alcohol purchases brought home using a
barcode-scanning device. The HomeScan dataset includes a
unique level of detail on individual household alcohol purchases
that is not provided in other publicly available population survey
datasets, such as alcohol type, brand, flavour, size (millilitres),
quantity, packaging (e.g. multi-pack), price paid per item (A$), total
spend per shopping trip, and the date and location (i.e. store name)
of the shopping trip, along with social, demographic, economic
and attitudinal information about the individual household and
the shopper. All households in our dataset participated in the
HomeScan panel for a 52-week period, from 24 January 2010 to
22 January 2011, and reside in the state of Victoria, which is
Australia’s second most populous state.
HomeScan data have been used extensively for research into
consumer behaviour in relation to food and nutrition, particularly
in the US [31,32,33], but has only been used in a small number of
alcohol studies [34,35]. Access to panel expenditure datasets such
as HomeScan is rare, particularly for studying alcohol purchasing
behaviour. Generally, alcohol researchers and policy makers rely
upon periodic, self-report population surveys of household alcohol
expenditure or drinking patterns to monitor and analyse alcohol
consumption [36]. The limitations of such surveys are well
documented and include sampling bias, response bias, measure-
ment bias, and recall bias, with under-reporting of consumption by
heavy drinkers seen as a common weakness [36]. Annual estimates
of national per capita consumption of alcohol provide a more
Table 1. An example of how a minimum unit price (MUP) for alcohol affects alcohol prices.
Product characteristics
Product type Beer
Product brand name Golden Lager
Alcohol by volume, % 3.5
Unit volume, litres of beverage 0.375
Pack size, number of units 30
Pack volume, litres of beverage 11.25
Volume purchased
Number of packs purchased 2
Total volume purchased, litres of beverage 22.50
Total litres of pure alcohol (LALs) purchased 0.7875
Total number of standard drinks (0.01267 LALs) purchased 62.15
Original prices and taxes, A$




Original volumetric taxb Per standard drink: 0.35
Original 10% Goods and Services Tax (GST) when purchased Per standard drink: 0.07
Base pricec Per standard drink: 0.35
Estimated prices after applying a MUPd, A$
Original after tax retail price Per standard drink: 0.77
MUP inflation Per standard drink: 0.23
New after tax retail price Per standard drink: 1.00
aInclusive of original volumetric taxes (excise) and original 10% Goods and Services Tax (GST).
bA$41.68 per LAL above 1.15% ABV when purchased.
cExclusive of all original volumetric taxes (excise) and original 10% Goods and Services Tax (GST).
dInflation of prices to $1.00 per standard drink if the original after tax retail price was ,$1.00 per standard drink.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0080936.t001
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reliable indicator of total consumption, but in many jurisdictions
these are reported at a national population level only, thus
constraining their usefulness for studying consumer behaviour in
detail.
The appeal of HomeScan panel data, therefore, is that it
overcomes some of the limits of existing surveys by collecting
information on each household’s alcohol purchasing constantly
over 52-weeks, and includes disaggregated detail about daily
shopping trips and individual products purchased by each
household. A validation study of HomeScan data in the US found
that households reported single purchases 99% accurately and
multiple purchases 86% accurately (when checked against stores’
sales records), and the small level of recording errors is similar to
other research datasets for which cross-validation studies have
been undertaken [37]. However, it should be noted while off-trade
alcohol represents the majority (78%) of the total drinks market in
Australia [38], HomeScan data does not include all households’
entire off-trade alcohol purchases, as some are likely to be not
bought home and scanned. For example, a household’s shopper
may occasionally purchase off-trade alcohol without returning
home before consuming it at another location or giving it away.
For the purposes of estimating the effect of alcohol taxation and
pricing policies on consumers, alcohol sales/expenditure data such
as ours is very attractive because of its relative robustness and
coverage. A recent study by Robinson et al [39] found that data on
alcohol sales records are, in general, a robust source of data for
monitoring alcohol consumption. A study by Ramstedt [40] found
that self-reported alcohol purchases achieve a higher coverage rate
than found typically in studies based on self-reported use of alcohol.
Furthermore, Ruhm and colleagues [41] observe that the most
useful estimates of price elasticity of demand for alcohol are
obtained using annual Uniform Product Code (UPC) barcode
scanner data on grocery store alcohol prices, as this accurately
provides the price of each individual alcoholic beverage product.
To ensure the panel is a representative sample of the Australian
population, the HomeScan panel is built using a sampling frame
based on Australian Bureau of Statistics information on the
geographic, demographic, social and economic distribution of the
Australian population. Recruitment to the panel is determined by
the primary shoppers’ attributes. Key attributes used to filter
recruitment to the panel include family type (life stage), household
size, age, and income. The classification based on life stage is:
i. Young Singles/Couples: All Adults ,35, no children, size 1
or 2;
ii. Young Families: Adults/Shopper Any Age, and all children
,11;
iii. Older Families: Adults/Shopper Any Age; at least 1 person
aged 11–19, but no children ,11;
iv. Older Singles/Couples: All Adults aged 45+, no children,
size 1 or 2; and,
v. Adult Households: All Adults aged 21+; excludes (i) to (iv).
The distribution of households in our sample by life stage
(family composition) is broadly similar to that found in the most
recent Australian Census of Population and Housing [42]. For
example, using the figures reported by the Census and 2010
National Drug Strategy Household Survey [43] (of individuals
aged 14+ years), it is estimated that around 37% of couples with
children consume alcohol. The corresponding figure from our
sample is of similar magnitude (33.5%). Similarly, the median
income of families in our sample is $78500, which is similar to that
reported in the Census ($77000 per annum) [43].
Estimating distribution and apparent consumption of
alcohol
Alcoholic content (% alcohol by volume) and the number of
standards drinks (12.67 ml of pure alcohol) were manually coded
to all individual alcohol products in our dataset, as this was not
included within the original HomeScan data file. We were then
able to accurately calculate the litres of pure alcohol (LALs) and
number of standard drinks purchased at a household and per
capita level, as well as the mean prices paid per standard drink for
all beverage types. For example, we have information that on 24th
March 2010, a brand of mid-strength beer was purchased from a
supermarket, as a pack containing 30 units with 375 ml in each
unit, and two packs were purchased at a price of $24.00 per pack.
The quantity of beer in each pack was 11.250 litres, and the ABV
for this beer is 3.5%. Using this detailed information, we first
calculate the total spending on beer which is $48. We then
calculate total quantity of beer in ml which is 22,500 ml and
convert the total quantity into the number of standard drinks using
the following formula: standard drink= (quantity*ABV)/
(12.67*100). This equates to a total of 62.15 standard drinks in
our example. Next, we calculate price per drink by dividing total
spend $48.00 by 62.15, which, in this example, equates to 77 cents
per standard drink.
Our approach to examine the distribution and levels of alcohol
consumption across the sample of households involves as a first
step, dividing the total per capita volume of alcohol purchased
across five quantiles (quintiles) of the households in our sample
using ‘xtile’ command in Stata software (Version 11). This ensures
that quintiles are data determined objectively and not based on
any ad-hoc cut-offs or other subjective thresholds. This approach
has been used widely to examine the distribution of alcohol
consumption in the population, whereby the cumulative percent-
age of alcohol consumed is divided across percentile groupings of
the population [20,44,45]. We include all persons aged 12+ years
within each household as the denominator, as the usual age
category used internationally for such estimates (persons aged 15+
years) [36] is not disaggregated in the dataset.
Estimating changes in cost and consumption
Here we estimate the effects of applying a MUP of A$1.00 per
12.67 mls of alcohol (i.e. 1 standard drink measure in Australia)
sold in off-trade products [See Table 1]. While comparisons
between countries are not straightforward, in England and
Scotland the proposed MUP for the equivalent volume of alcohol
is £0.57 (A$0.87) and £0.63 (A$0.96), respectively. In the
Canadian provinces, where minimum prices vary widely accord-
ing to product type, alcohol volume, and outlet, the MUP per
12.67 mls of alcohol ranges from CAD$0.48 (A$0.46) to CAD$2.04
(A$1.96) as at June 2010 [46]. We chose a MUP of A$1.00 per
standard drink for our study as it equates closely to the proposed
minimum prices in the UK. We also note an Australian report that
claimed a minimum price of A$1.00 per standard drink would
remove very cheap (,A$0.50) products that are the choice
amongst the heaviest drinkers, would reduce alcohol consumption
and related harms most amongst disadvantaged populations and
young people, but would not affect the price of relatively expensive
products that the majority of moderate drinkers purchase [47].
We estimate the effects of a new uniform volumetric tax on all
beverages as recommended recently to the Australian government
by the panel that reviewed the alcohol tax system [11] [see
Table 2]. Their recommended uniform volumetric tax rate, based
on Cnossen’s [48] estimate of the rate required to recover the full
external costs of alcohol, is equivalent to that for off-trade beer
with an alcohol content.3.5% (A$41.68 per litre of alcohol (LAL))
Impact of Alcohol Taxation on Type of Drinkers
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at the time our data were collected, with an exemption from
taxation for the first 1.15% of alcohol in all beverages [49]. While
the effect of a MUP on after-tax retail prices is reasonably clear
(i.e. prices must rise to at least the stipulated minimum), the effect
of a volumetric tax on after-tax retail prices is less straightforward
because there is usually no mandatory requirement for producers
or retailers to adjust prices in line with tax changes so long as the
required amount of tax is paid to the government. There is only a
small body of empirical evidence on the extent to which alcohol
taxes are passed-through to consumer prices. An alcohol tax pass-
through rate is calculated by dividing the real change in price by
the amount of tax increase for a beverage of specific type and size.
Understanding pass-through rates from tax changes to consumer
prices is key to appreciating how tax changes can affect consumers,
producers, retailers and society as a whole [50]. While Australian
modelling studies often assume that changes in alcohol tax are
passed on to and paid in full by consumers [18,51,52], within the
international scientific literature there is considerable heterogene-
ity in reported pass-through rates. Factors that can contribute to
the variation in pass-through rates includes market structure,
geographic location, consumers’ beverage preference, brand, store
type, and the status of other alcohol policies [4,50]. Some studies
report that alcohol tax increases are more than passed-through in
full to consumer prices [53,54,55]. Conversely, some studies have
found alcohol taxes are less than fully passed-through to prices,
and sometimes result in a negative change in prices paid by
consumers, possibly as a result of downshifting by drinkers to lesser
quality products [35]. A UK government report observed that
large supermarkets, which have significant purchasing power,
often cross-subsidise alcohol products which can mean prices do
not rise as much as tax increases, whereas pubs do not have the
same options and hence prices in these outlets often rise by more
than the tax increase [56]. Given the range of pass-through rates
reported in the literature, and the variation in pass-through rates
between products types and outlet types, we test a range of
assumed pass-through rates in our sensitivity analysis, reported
further below.
Consumer responsiveness to price changes
Systematic reviews show that while consumer demand for
alcohol is price responsive, it is relatively inelastic, with an average
own-price elasticity of around 20.5 [57,58]. That is, demand for
alcohol, measured by consumption, is reduced by half of one per
cent for every one per cent that the price is increased. An
important consideration in examining pricing and taxation policies
is the heterogeneity in price elasticity among drinkers. Previous
studies have shown that significant differences in price respon-
siveness exist between drinkers depending on their country-status
[59], age [57], sex [20], socio-economic status [60], beverage
preference [61], the quality of their beverage [24], and pattern of
drinking (i.e. heavy drinking) [62].
Given the focus of our study is to compare price responsiveness
among light, moderate and heavy consumers, and elasticity is
known to vary by different categories of drinkers, we assign
recently published own-price alcohol elasticities for Australian
drinkers to the consumers (within households) in our sample,
differentiated by drinking pattern and product type [see Table 3]
[63]. For these purposes, we assume consumers in our sample to
be heavy drinkers if their household’s average annual per capita
alcohol consumption exceeds 2 drinks/day. This is the case for
those in the 4th and 5th quintiles of alcohol consumption in our
sample [see Table 4]. Similarly, we assume consumers in the 2nd
and 3rd quintiles to be moderate drinkers, and those in the 1st
quintile to be light drinkers. We are cognisant that this approach of
using household per capita consumption assumes all adults in each
household consume same amount of alcohol, which may not be
the case. We therefore test the robustness of our methodology as
part of sensitivity analysis described later.
The question of substitution between alcoholic products when
prices change is also important for assessing all possible
ramifications of pricing and taxation changes. However, there is
currently insufficient evidence available on cross-price elasticities
for Australia that could be applied to our study and have a
significant effect on the results. There is also a scarcity of such
evidence more generally at the international level and further
research is warranted in this area, as Babor et al [19] notes there
have been no systematic reviews of cross-price elasticities between
alcohol beverage categories.
Among the few studies internationally that report cross-price
elasticities, these generally find very low substitution between
alcohol product categories. Modelling by Purshouse et al [30]
report separate cross-price elasticities for moderate and hazard-
ous/harmful drinkers in England, differentiated by on-trade and
off-trade beer, wine, spirits, and RTDs (i.e. 868 product
categories). The cross-price elasticities they report for off-trade
alcohol, which includes substitution from off-trade beverages to
other off-trade beverages and to the on-trade equivalent beverage,
are of a very low magnitude for moderate drinkers (less than
0.01% change in consumption following a 1.0% price increase)
and also very low for hazardous/harmful drinkers (less than 0.05%
change in consumption following a 1.0% price increase). More
recent estimates of cross-price elasticities for the UK report similar
findings: a mix of positive and negative signs numbering 46 and 44
respectively and only 6 out of 90 were statistically significant,
among which 5 out of 6 have positive signs [64]. Australian
modelling by Fogarty [65] reports cross-price elasticties, but only
between spirits and RTDs, and does not differentiate by on-trade
or off-trade. Like the international studies, the cross-price
elasticities for spirits/RTDs reported by Fogarty are very low
(0.06%–0.08% for ‘abusive consumers’).
Results
Distribution of alcohol consumption
Table 4 presents the summary descriptive statistics and
corresponding confidence intervals for the sample as a whole
and by quintile of apparent consumption. We use the command
‘‘ci’’ in Stata to calculate confidence interval. It uses the sample
mean, variance and two sided t-stats to calculate lower and upper
bounds of confidence interval. For clarity, we do not report alcohol
‘use’ or ‘drinking’ in the discussion below. However, we use the
terms ‘purchase’, ‘apparent consumption’, and ‘consumers’ of
alcohol inter-changeably.
The mean annual number of standard drinks purchased per
capita among all households is 834.4 (95% CI 809.58–859.26).
However, the distribution of the alcohol consumption among the
sample of households is highly unequal. Those in the 1st quintile
(the lightest 20% of consumers) on average purchase 47.7 standard
drinks per year (95% CI 46.54–48.80), while those in the 5th
quintile (the heaviest 20% of consumers) on average purchase
2808.5 standard drinks per year (95% CI 2719.06–2898.12).
Together, households in the 4th and 5th quintile account for only
10% of the total sample, yet consume 40% of the total volume of
alcohol, with an average apparent consumption above the
recommended level for low-risk of harm over the lifetime (i.e. no
more than 2 standard drinks/day over the lifetime). In contrast,
the 1st quintile represents 64% of the total sample, yet consume
only 20% of the total volume of alcohol.
Impact of Alcohol Taxation on Type of Drinkers
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Differences in prices paid, purchase frequency and
product preferences
The mean price paid per standard drink among all households
is $1.66 (range 0.194–13.23; 95% CI 1.62–1.70), but this differs
significantly between the heaviest consumers (A$1.31 (95% CI
1.20–1.41)) and the lightest consumers ($2.21 (95% CI 2.10–2.31)).
Although the heaviest consumers show a preference for relatively
cheaper alcohol, we find that they are by far the highest and most
frequent spenders in the sample. Compared to the lightest
consumers, the heaviest consumers spend 79% (A$29.55) more
on alcohol per shopping trip, purchase three times as much
alcohol (49.5 standard drinks) per shopping trip, and make 12
times the number of shopping trips to purchase alcohol per year.
Among all quintiles, the product type that is purchased in the
highest volume is cask wine [see Table 5]. The contribution of cask
wine to heavy consumption of alcohol is profound. Consumption
of cask wine among the heaviest consumers (4th and 5th quintiles)
alone accounts for 83% of the total cask wine consumed by the
entire sample of households. This type of alcohol is also the
cheapest to purchase, costing $0.34 per standard drink on average
(95% CI 0.33–0.35) [see Table 6]. Fortified wine, which has the
highest alcohol content of all wine product categories (17.5% ABV
on average), is also relatively cheap, costing $0.72 per standard
Table 2. Method for estimating the effects of a uniform volumetric tax on prices.
Step 1
Using detailed information on every individual product purchased by households in our dataset, we calculate the base price for each individual product (i.e. exclusive of
original excise (on beer and spirits), the original WET tax (on wine), and the original 10% Goods & Services Tax (GST)) by deducting the estimated tax component in each
from the individual product’s original after tax retail price.
Examples
Product brand name Mountain Top Merlot River Crossing Chardonnay
Product type Table wine Cask wine
Alcohol by volume (ABV) (%) 14.0 14.0
Unit volume (litres of beverage) 0.75 4.0
Litres of alcohol (LALs) 0.105 0.560
Original after tax retail price: $10.00 $12.00
Original WET tax component $1.45 $1.74
Original GST component $0.91 $1.09
Base price $7.64 $9.17
Step 2
We then calculate the new amount of volumetric tax applicable to each individual product (i.e. A$41.68 per LAL, excluding the first 1.15% of alcohol in each product).
Examples (continued from Step 1):
LALs excluding first 1.15% ABV 0.09638 0.514
New volumetric tax $4.02 $21.42
Step 3
We add the new uniform volumetric tax amount to the base price for each product, apply the 10% GST, and then calculate new mean after tax retail prices for all
product types. We also assume a range of different tax pass-through rates as part of a sensitivity analysis.
Examples (continued from Step 2)
Base price+new volumetric taxa $11.66 $30.59
New GST $1.17 $3.06
New after tax retail price: $12.83 $33.65
aFull pass-through rates of the new volumetric tax are assumed in this example.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0080936.t002
Table 3. Estimated own-price elasticities for households by drinking pattern sub-group, consumption volume quintile, and
product type.
Drinking pattern (Consumption volume)
Product type Light (1st quintile) Moderate (2nd and 3rd quintiles) Heavy (4th and 5th quintiles)
Wine 20.53 20.42 20.28
Beer 20.49 20.39 20.26
Spirits 21.28 21.01 20.68
RTDs 20.89 20.70 20.47
Source: Adapted from MJA 2012 [63].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0080936.t003
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drink on average (95% CI 0.67–0.76). We find that compared to
the lightest consumers, the heaviest consumers favour cheaper
products, and this is consistent across all product categories [see
Figure 1]. With regards to cask wine, the heaviest consumers pay a
mean price of only A$0.31 per standard drink (95% CI 0.304–
0.316), compared to the lightest consumers who pay a mean price
of A$0.44 per standard drink (95% CI 0.418–0.456). The
difference in mean price paid between the heaviest and lightest
alcohol consumers is even greater with regards to fortified wine
($0.49 compared to $0.96 per standard drink).
Effects of a minimum price and new volumetric tax on
retail prices
By applying a MUP of A$1.00 per standard drink, we estimate
that only cask wine and fortified wine would increase substantially
in price [see Table 6]. The estimated mean retail price of a 4-litre
cask of wine containing 36 standard drinks would increase by
190% to $36.00, and the estimated mean retail price of a 750 ml
bottle of fortified wine containing 11 standard drinks would
increase by 58% to $12.53. The mean retail prices of sparkling and
table wine, beer, spirits, and RTDs are almost unaffected by a
MUP. In contrast, applying a uniform volumetric tax all alcohol
products of $41.68 per LAL (with zero tax on the initial 1.15% of
alcohol) affects prices of all product types, but in different ways.
While the mean retail price of beer and wine products would
increase, other products, such as spirits and cider would potentially
decrease in price.
Estimated changes in costs for consumers and effects on
purchasing
Changes in the estimated mean annual cost of alcohol purchases
per capita for each consumption quintile as a result of introducing
a MUP and a new uniform volumetric tax are shown in Table 7.
We also present the estimated changes to the mean annual
volume of alcohol purchased per capita resulting from changes in
the cost of alcohol to consumers. Due to the negligible effect of a
MUP on consumers of spirits, and for the purposes of brevity and
space, we present results for wine and beer consumers only. We
find that both a MUP and a new uniform volumetric tax have little
effect on changing the overall cost of purchasing wine and beer
among light and moderate consumers, and likewise little effect
upon the volume of alcohol they purchase. However, with regards
to the heaviest consumers, we estimate that a MUP would have a
substantial effect on reducing the mean volume of wine (215.78
LALs) and beer (21.85 LALs) purchased. While it is less effective
than a MUP, a new uniform volumetric tax would still have a large
effect on reducing the mean volume of wine and beer purchased
(29.56 and 20.49 LALs, respectively).
Importantly, we estimate that a MUP would result in a much
smaller increase in the mean annual per capita cost for the heaviest
consumers of wine (A$393.60) and beer (A$108.26), compared to a
new uniform volumetric tax on wine and beer (A$552.46 and
A$163.82, respectively). That is, our analysis reveals that a MUP
would not only achieve greater reductions in heavy consumption
than a new uniform volumetric tax, it would also achieve this at a
lower cost to consumers.
Further, our analysis shows that the proportion of total cost
incurred by light and moderate consumers would rise incremen-
tally as the value of the MUP per standard drink increases:
$1.00= 7%; $1.50= 16%; $2.00 or more= 21%. This underlines
the attractiveness of a MUP of $1.00, as it produces only a small
increase in the cost for the lightest consumers but results in
significant increases in the cost for the heaviest consumers, and in
turn significantly reduces their consumption.
Sensitivity Analysis
Effect of tax pass-through rates
Our analysis assumes that a new uniform volumetric tax on
alcohol is fully passed through (pass-through rate = 1) to after tax
retail prices. This is a reasonable assumption in a perfectly
competitive market with constant marginal costs of production.
However, in less competitive markets the tax pass-through rate
could be less than or greater than 1 depending on the type of
market structure. We re-estimate the cost increase to consumers
resulting from a new uniform volumetric tax using assumptions of
varying tax pass-through rates [see Table 8]. For beer, we
compare estimates derived from pass-through rates reported by
Kenkel [54] for off-premise beer (minimum: 0.87; full: 1.0; and,
average: 1.67). Similarly, for wine we compare estimates derived
from three pass-through rates (0.5, 1 and 1.5) that reflect low, full,
and high pass through rates, as generally found in the literature.
































28 (3.16) 2,808.59 (2,719.06–
2,898.12)
1.31 (1.20–1.41) 67.15 (64.24–70.04) 73.93 (70.88–76.97) 78.22 (76.80–79.63)
4th quintile 52 (5.88) 853.08 (844.76–861.40) 1.18 (1.12–1.24) 51.87 (49.94–53.79) 56.97 (55.38–58.55) 39.99 (39.19–40.79)
3rd quintile 91 (10.28) 361.79 (358.35–365.21) 1.72 (1.63–1.80) 55.42 (53.78–57.04) 45.34 (43.98–46.68) 23.21 (22.72–23.68)
2nd quintile 147 (16.61) 169.74 (168.19–178.21) 1.91 (1.81–1.99) 49.13 (47.81–50.43) 36.19 (35.46–36.91) 15.54 (15.12–15.94)
1st quintile (20%
lightest consumers)
567 (64.07) 47.67 (46.54–48.80) 2.21 (2.10–2.31) 37.60 (36.51–38.67) 24.39 (23.73–25.04) 6.46 (6.2–6.71)
All Households 885 (100.00) 834.4 (809.58–859.26) 1.66 (1.62–1.70) 52.14 (51.29–52.99) 47.20 (46.39–48.01) 32.37 (31.81–32.93)
aConsumption volume is the volume of pure alcohol purchased by each of the five quintiles of households, where each quintile represents 20% of the cumulative
volume of alcohol purchased by the entire sample.
CI refers to Confidence Interval.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0080936.t004
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We find that there is no significant cost increase for light and
moderate consumers of beer or wine resulting from any of the
three different tax pass-through rates tested, and that it is mostly
heavy consumers that are affected by a new uniform volumetric
tax on alcohol, irrespective of the tax pass-through rates assumed.
Effect of applying a MUP and a new uniform volumetric
tax simultaneously
As discussed earlier, in the context of current policy discussion
in Australia, volumetric tax and a MUP are framed as two
alternative options. However, it may be feasible for government to
implement combinations of the two, and it may also be desirable
to do so given that a volumetric tax will not necessarily prevent
some alcohol from being sold below cost or given away. In this
way, the two policies would potentially complement each other if
introduced simultaneously. We estimate the difference in cost
increases for consumers if both a new uniform volumetric tax of
$41.68 per LAL and MUP of $1.00 per standard drink were
applied to wine products simultaneously [see Table 9]. We find
that compared with applying a new uniform volumetric tax alone,
there would be only small changes in the cost of alcohol for
consumers in all quintiles if both a MUP and new volumetric tax
were applied simultaneously. Likewise, there would be only small
differences in the change in consumption among light, moderate
and heavy consumers resulting from applying both policies
simultaneously compared with applying a new uniform volumetric
tax only. With regards to beer, after a new uniform volumetric tax
of $41.68 per LAL is applied, we estimate that no beer products
would have after tax retail prices below $1.00 per standard drink,
and, thus applying MUP of $1.00 per standard drink in this
situation appears to be redundant.
Effects of household size and composition
As discussed earlier, while we assume that all adults in a
household consume the same volume of alcohol and that elasticity
is constant across household members, this may not be the case.
Therefore, we test the robustness of our methodology by
comparing household quintiles constructed according to two
different methods: (A) assumes all alcohol purchased is consumed
equally among all adults in the household; and, (B) assumes all
alcohol purchased is consumed by only one person in the
household [see Table 10]. We find that using either method A
or B makes little difference to which consumption quintiles (heavy,
moderate, or light consumers) the households in our sample are
allocated. For 92% of households, the quintile to which they were
allocated using method A remains the same when method B is
applied. Furthermore, given the low magnitude of elasticities
(ranging from 20.26 to 20.53), any bias introduced due to our
assumption of constant elasticity will be minimal.
We also consider the effect of household composition upon our
estimates of alcohol consumption, including whether the level of
Figure 1. Mean retail price paid (A$) per standard drink for selected alcohol product types, 1st and 5th consumption quintiles.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0080936.g001
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consumption by households comprising large families with teenage
children could bias our estimates. The average household size in
our sample is relatively small (2.1 adults per household), with 23%
of households comprising only one adult and 54% comprising two
adults. In terms of ‘life stage’ categories of households (which are
the demographic descriptors supplied to us by Nielsen with the
HomeScan dataset), 65% of households are categorised as singles,
couples or adult households, and 15% are categorised as young families
with all children less than 11 years. Only 18% of households are
categorised as older families where all children are more than 11 years,
where there is some probability of alcohol consumption by a non-
adult (person aged between 12 and 19 years old). Using these
classifications of household types, we examine whether the
distribution of different household types across the quintiles differs
when applying method A or method B to estimate consumption.
We find that the allocation of households to the light, moderate or
heavy quintiles remains unchanged for most of the sample,
irrespective of using method A or method B to estimate
consumption levels.
Discussion
The findings of our study contribute to understanding alcohol
purchasing behaviour across the population and have implications
for alcohol pricing and taxation policy. While empirical studies in
Canada show the effect of minimum prices on overall consump-
tion [26,27], and modelling studies in the UK have compared the
estimated effect of various minimum price thresholds, restrictions
on discounted price-promotions, and percentage increases in the
retail price of alcohol [20,29,30], the advantage of our study is that
it compares the estimated effects of a MUP and a volumetric tax
according to different levels of consumption, and uses highly
detailed electronically-scanned records of household-level alcohol
expenditure for this analysis.
Our analysis indicates that a MUP would impact most on those
who consume high volumes of alcohol. We find a new uniform
volumetric tax would achieve somewhat less reductions in heavy
consumption than a MUP, and would result in relatively greater
increases in the cost for light, moderate and heavy consumers.
However, we do not conclude that a new uniform volumetric tax is
an inferior policy option to a MUP, nor do we wish to suggest that
they are mutually exclusive. On the contrary, both policies could
potentially be complementary, particularly as much of a MUP’s
usefulness appears to lie in addressing the failings of the current ad
valorem tax arrangements for wine. We find that applying both a
MUP and a new uniform volumetric tax simultaneously would not
adversely affect light and moderate drinkers any more than
applying a new uniform volumetric tax alone, and together would
still have the desired effect of reducing heavy consumption. Our
study clearly shows the conspicuous role that cheap wine plays in
heavy consumption of alcohol, and that either of the two pricing
policy options, or combined, could be effective in significantly
changing consumption behaviour.
Some commentators have suggested that a drawback of a MUP
in many jurisdictions is that the increased revenue resulting from
inflating the price of some products would potentially remain with
privately licensed retailers of alcohol [66], and would hence be
foregone by government unless a means of recouping it were
implemented. The appeal of a new uniform volumetric tax, on the
other hand, is that most of the increased revenue is collected by
government through well-established mechanisms, and therefore
returned to the community. However, careful consideration of the
optimal rate (or rates) of a new volumetric tax to effectively
discourage heavy consumption will be critical.
Overall, our findings underline the importance of either a MUP
or a volumetric tax for a public health orientated alcohol taxation
system. We have not considered the complementary effects of
other alcohol polices that could be implemented concurrently with
a MUP or volumetric taxation, but these remain very important.
Controls on the physical availability of alcohol, strong enforce-
ment of liquor laws, restrictions on advertising, health service
interventions, and public education campaigns may also play a key
role in reducing the alcohol disease burden, and the impact of a
MUP and volumetric tax reform would potentially be greater if
implemented as part of a multi-pronged alcohol strategy.
A limitation of our study is the lack of matched records of
households’ drinking patterns with alcohol purchases in our
dataset, under-reporting of some off-trade alcohol purchases, the
lack of records for on-trade purchases, and not accounting for
possible substitution between products, although this is unlikely
given a MUP minimises the availability of cheap alternatives.
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